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041 _aeng
100 1 _aKonkin, Doug
_922604
245 _aWhen executives rake in millions
_bthe callous treatment of lower level employees
264 _aBoston
_c2011
300 _a48 páginas
505 _aIntroduction -- Conceptualization of callous treatment -- The relationship between managerial compensation and employee treatment -- Study 1: Archival data -- Study 2: Laboratory experiment -- General discussion
520 _aThe topic of top manager compensation has received tremendous attention over the years from both the research community and the popular media. In this paper, we examine a heretofore ignored consequence of rising top manager compensation. Specifically, we argue that when top managers receive high levels of compensation, they tend to treat lower level employees callously. Further, we present findings from two studies that support this contention. In an archival study of large public US corporations, we show that firms that award their top managers high levels of compensation employ less benevolent and harsher employee relations practices. In a laboratory experiment we show that subjects assigned to the managerial role and who receive high levels of compensation are more likely to fire their subordinates than those who receive low levels of compensation. We discuss the implications of our findings for organizations and offer some tentative remedies to address the broader issue of excessive executive compensation.
650 _aEMPLEADOS
_9716
650 _aDERECHO LABORAL
_9623
650 _aINVESTIGACIÓN
_91105
650 _aPENSIONES DE VEJEZ
_928938
650 _aCUIDADO DE LA SALUD
_93845
650 _aGERENTES
_928568
650 _aEJECUTIVOS
_928906
650 0 _aMANUALES
_92340
650 _aSUELDOS
_9721
650 _aTRATO CRUEL
_928939
700 _aPalmer, Donald Anthony
_928940
700 _aGeorge Jennifer
_928941
700 _aKanel, Keshav
_922603
856 _uhttp://www.researchgate.net/publication/228181990_When_Executives_Rake_in_Millions_The_Callous_Treatment_of_Lower_Level_Employees
942 _2lcc
_cREL