When executives rake in millions (Registro nro. 2757)
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| 000 -LIDER | |
|---|---|
| Campo de control de longitud fija | 02451nam a22003377a 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 000006292 |
| 005 - FECHA Y HORA DE ULTIMA TRANSACCION | |
| Campo de control | 20201206191139.0 |
| 008 - ELEMENTOS DE LONGITUD FIJA--INFORMACION GENERAL | |
| Campo de control de longitud fija | 201206b ||||| |||| 00| 0 spa d |
| 041 ## - CODIGO DE IDIOMA | |
| Código de idioma para texto | eng |
| 100 1# - ASIENTO PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE PERSONAL | |
| Nombre personal | Konkin, Doug |
| 9 (RLIN) | 22604 |
| 245 ## - TITULO | |
| Título | When executives rake in millions |
| Subtítulo | the callous treatment of lower level employees |
| 264 ## - PRODUCCION, PUBLICACION, ETC. | |
| Lugar de producción | Boston |
| Fecha de producción, publicación, etc. | 2011 |
| 300 ## - DESCRIPCION FISICA | |
| Extensión | 48 páginas |
| 505 ## - NOTA DE CONTENIDO | |
| Nota de contenido | Introduction -- Conceptualization of callous treatment -- The relationship between managerial compensation and employee treatment -- Study 1: Archival data -- Study 2: Laboratory experiment -- General discussion |
| 520 ## - NOTA DE RESUMEN, ETC. | |
| Nota de sumario, etc. | The topic of top manager compensation has received tremendous attention over the years from both the research community and the popular media. In this paper, we examine a heretofore ignored consequence of rising top manager compensation. Specifically, we argue that when top managers receive high levels of compensation, they tend to treat lower level employees callously. Further, we present findings from two studies that support this contention. In an archival study of large public US corporations, we show that firms that award their top managers high levels of compensation employ less benevolent and harsher employee relations practices. In a laboratory experiment we show that subjects assigned to the managerial role and who receive high levels of compensation are more likely to fire their subordinates than those who receive low levels of compensation. We discuss the implications of our findings for organizations and offer some tentative remedies to address the broader issue of excessive executive compensation. |
| 650 ## - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | EMPLEADOS |
| -- | 716 |
| 650 ## - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | DERECHO LABORAL |
| -- | 623 |
| 650 ## - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | INVESTIGACIÓN |
| -- | 1105 |
| 650 ## - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | PENSIONES DE VEJEZ |
| -- | 28938 |
| 650 ## - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | CUIDADO DE LA SALUD |
| -- | 3845 |
| 650 ## - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | GERENTES |
| -- | 28568 |
| 650 ## - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | EJECUTIVOS |
| -- | 28906 |
| 650 #0 - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | MANUALES |
| -- | 2340 |
| 650 ## - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | SUELDOS |
| -- | 721 |
| 650 ## - MATERIA--TERMINO TEMATICO | |
| Término temático | TRATO CRUEL |
| -- | 28939 |
| 700 ## - ASIENTO SECUNDARIO --NOMBRE PERSONAL | |
| Nombre personal | Palmer, Donald Anthony |
| 700 ## - ASIENTO SECUNDARIO --NOMBRE PERSONAL | |
| Nombre personal | George Jennifer |
| 700 ## - ASIENTO SECUNDARIO --NOMBRE PERSONAL | |
| Nombre personal | Kanel, Keshav |
| 856 ## - LOCALIZACION Y ACCESO ELECTRONICO | |
| Identificador Uniforme del Recurso | <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228181990_When_Executives_Rake_in_Millions_The_Callous_Treatment_of_Lower_Level_Employees">http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228181990_When_Executives_Rake_in_Millions_The_Callous_Treatment_of_Lower_Level_Employees</a> |
| 942 ## - CAMPOS ADICIONALES (KOHA) | |
| Fuente de clasificación | Library of Congress Classification |
| Tipo de ítem | Recursos Electrónicos |
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